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Abstract 
Background: South Africa has followed a pro-generic policy since the introduction of the National Drug Policy in 1996. The selection processes in 
the public and private sectors have, however, remained largely disconnected, and at times contradictory. Medicines provided outside of hospitals 
accounted for 17% of medical aid spend in 2006, up 8.8% from the previous year. Of particular concern to funders has been the expenditure on the 
27 chronic conditions listed as Prescribed Minimum Benefits. The Medical Schemes Act (No 131 of 1998) provides for the definition of Prescribed 
Minimum Benefits, which stipulate a package of services or care a medical scheme must provide for in its benefit design. There is pressure to 
reconsider these requirements in order to increase the affordability of medical scheme coverage. This study assessed the potential savings that 
would be achievable by substituting generics for brand name (originator) medicines listed in the chronic disease algorithms set out by the Council 
for Medical Schemes (CMS). 
Methods: All medicines listed in the 25 chronic diseases algorithms made available by the CMS were identified. Brand and generic versions were 
identified in the Monthly Index of Medical Specialties (MIMS, May 2006). Single exit prices inclusive of value added tax were obtained from the web 
site of the Pharmaceutical Blue Book and the cost per defined daily dose for one month was then calculated. Cost differentials, where available, were 
then identified for each medicine listed in the algorithms. Cost differentials for medicines within each algorithm were presented as the median of 
the difference between brand and generic medicines listed for that algorithm, and also as the median of differences between generic medicines for 
the same condition.
Results: Three of the algorithms (diabetes insipidus, haemophilia and hypothyroidism) list medicines for which no generic equivalent was available at 
the time of the study. The median cost differential between brand and generic equivalents for the remaining 22 chronic conditions ranged from 19.5% 
(for type 1 diabetes mellitus) to 97% (for Addison’s disease). Across the entire chronic disease algorithm set, 80 medicines with generic equivalents 
were listed for 22 conditions. The median cost differential between brand and generic versions of these 80 medicines was 49.9% (interquartile range 
32.0 to 78.5%). Of all generic medicines identified, 67.5% were more than 40% cheaper, per defined daily dose (DDD) per month, than the branded 
version. In 16 medicines the cost differentials between generic versions were 1% or less. Some correlation between the number of generics and the 
size of the cost differential was apparent (correlation coefficient 0.49). There were examples of high-cost differentials in highly competitive areas of 
the market. 
Conclusions: An argument could be made for more closely aligning the process of developing the National Essential Drugs List and the development 
of the CMS algorithms. By being more specific about which medicines should be covered, needless expenditure on “me-too” agents of doubtful 
additional benefit could be avoided. Where clinically warranted, appropriate choices could be provided. Finality in respect of the pricing of medicines 
needs to be achieved. This applies not only to the dispensing fee but also to the proposed benchmarking process and the proposed differential 
between brand and generic medicines.
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Introduction
South Africa’s National Drug Policy, approved by the Cabinet in 1996, 
committed the country to the use of generic medicines as a key cost-
savings mechanism.1 One of the stated aims of the policy was “[t]o 
promote the availability of safe and effective drugs at the lowest possible 
cost”. The means to achieve this was stated as follows: “This aim will be 
achieved by monitoring and negotiating drug prices and by rationalising 
the drug pricing system in the public and private sectors, and by 
promoting the use of generic drugs”. The detailed policy prescription 
went further: “The policy will aim at achieving generic prescribing in 
both the public and private sectors. Until this aim is achieved, generic 
substitution will be allowed, through legislation, in the public and the 
private sector”. A pro-generic stance was also signalled in respect of 
medicines selection: “A National Essential Drugs List Committee (NEDLC), 
appointed by the Minister of Health, will be responsible for the selection 
of drugs to be used in the public sector. … The NEDLC will draw up 
and periodically review a National List of Essential Drugs using generic 
names”. However, the extent to which this selection would impact on 
the private sector was seen as less certain. While the Essential Drugs 
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List would be used as the foundation for many aspects in the public 
sector, including “the basic health care package of the National Health 
System for Universal Primary Care” and “standard treatment guidelines 
and training in rational prescribing”, its application in the private sector 
was left almost to chance: “The list may also be used as a model for 
medical aid schemes”.
Medicines dispensed outside of hospitals (by pharmacists and 
dispensing practitioners) accounted for 17% of medical scheme benefits 
paid out in 2006. This reflected an increase of 8.8% over the previous 
year, totalling R8.7 billion.2 Of particular concern to funders has been 
the expenditure on the 27 chronic conditions listed as Prescribed 
Minimum Benefits (PMBs). The Medical Schemes Act (No 131 of 1998) 
defines PMBs as a package of services or care a medical scheme must 
provide for in its benefit design.3 The PMB package was extended with 
the introduction of a chronic disease list (CDL) and an accompanying 
set of prescribed treatment algorithms (for 25 conditions) in late 2003.4 
The CDL was expanded later to include HIV/AIDS and bipolar mood 
disorder, but no algorithms were provided for these two conditions. 
Only the algorithm for multiple sclerosis has been amended.5 In terms of 
HIV/AIDS, the injunction is that a medical scheme should provide at least 
those services and treatments that are provided by the state. Medical 
schemes have to provide benefits and pay for the full management of 
the 27 conditions with no co-payments. In order to contain the costs 
incurred by providing PMBs for the chronic conditions and to ensure that 
schemes can financially cover their members who need this benefit, the 
Regulations to the Medical Schemes Act have allowed certain measures 
to be introduced by the medical schemes.6 Schemes are, for example, 
permitted to draw up a list of safe and effective medicines (known as a 
formulary) to treat certain conditions. Many of these medicines would be 
expected to be generics and if a brand name medicine were prescribed 
and dispensed, the scheme would have the right to limit coverage to the 
cost of a referenced generic version. Despite these measures, the costs 
of providing PMB cover remain a concern. In the Council for Medical 
Schemes (CMS) 2006/2007 Annual Report it was stated that proposed 
rule amendments to their benefit options submitted by 41% of open 
medical schemes were initially rejected. One of the reasons listed for 
initial rejection was “inadequate provisions being made for Prescribed 
Minimum Benefits”.2 A recent newspaper article has cited three medical 
scheme industry priorities for the future.7 In order to attract new 
members, industry commentators felt that there needed to be changes 
made to the PMB legislation, greater use of contracted provider networks 
and better benefit design for low-income medical schemes. 
Protecting the PMBs, as a key element of the new community-rated 
medical schemes environment, is therefore vital. One way to do this 
would be to limit the costs of medicines provided for the management of 
chronic conditions listed in the PMBs. This study assessed the potential 
savings that would be achievable by substituting generics for brand 
name (originator) medicines listed in the chronic disease algorithms set 
out by the CMS. 
Methods
Ethics approval was obtained for this research project. A census was 
conducted of the 25 chronic diseases for which algorithms were made 
available by the CMS. All medicines listed were then sought in the South 
African Medicines Formulary (7th edition). Where a pharmacological 
class rather than a specific medicine was listed in the algorithm, all 
examples of the class listed in the South African Medicines Formulary 
were included. Brand and generic versions were identified in the most 
accessible form available to medical practitioners, namely the Monthly 
Index of Medical Specialties (MIMS). The May 2006 issue was used. Brand 
versions were those initially registered by an innovator or research-based 
pharmaceutical manufacturer, whereas generic versions were those of 
the same strength and dosage form, registered after patent expiry or as 
licensed by the patent-holder. 
Single exit prices (SEPs), inclusive of value added tax, were obtained from 
the web site of the Pharmaceutical Blue Book (http://www.pbb.co.za/). 
All SEPs were obtained prior to the increases allowed from January 
2007. The cost per defined daily dose (DDD) for one month (defined as 
30 days) was then calculated. DDDs were obtained from the web site 
of the World Health Organization (WHO) Collaborating Centre for Drug 
Statistics Methodology (http://www.whocc.no/atcddd/). This site defines 
a DDD as follows: “The DDD is the assumed average maintenance dose 
per day for a drug used for its main indication in adults”. DDDs may 
not, however, bear any direct relation to the actual doses prescribed 
nor match the most appropriate clinical dose. They are, nonetheless, a 
standard applicable to utilisation studies and allow comparison across 
different care settings. Given the uncertainty in the market relating to 
dispensing fees, these were not included in cost calculations. The listing 
of medicines as “non-substitutable” by the Medicines Control Council 
was also not taken into account, as each of these could potentially be 
prescribed as the generic version, if available, based on an individual’s 
assessment. While, in this case, substitution by the pharmacist is 
proscribed, the prescriber would have the option of choosing a generic, 
either initially or for a patient who has previously been treated with a 
branded version. Cost differentials, where available, were then identified 
for each medicine listed in the CMS algorithms. Cost differentials for 
medicines within each algorithm were presented as the median of the 
difference between brand and generic medicines listed for that algorithm, 
and also as the median of differences between generic medicines for the 
same condition.
Results
Three of the CDL algorithms list medicines for which no generic 
equivalent was available at the time of the study. These were diabetes 
insipidus, haemophilia and hypothyroidism. The median cost differential 
between brand and generic equivalents for the remaining 22 chronic 
conditions ranged from 19.5% (for type 1 diabetes mellitus) to 97% (for 
Addison’s disease). Of these, three conditions involved the use of only 
one generic equivalent and, therefore, a comparison between two or 
more generics was not possible. These were diabetes type 1, glaucoma 
and Parkinson’s disease. The median cost differentials between brand 
and generic versions and between generic versions per algorithm are 
shown in Figure 1. 
Across the entire CDL algorithm set, 80 medicines with generic 
equivalents were listed for 22 conditions. The median cost differential 
between brand and generic versions of these 80 medicines was 49.9% 
(interquartile range 32.0 to 78.5%). Of all generic medicines identified, 
67.5% were more than 40% cheaper, per DDD per month, than the 
branded version. 
Cost differentials between generic medicines were not always as large 
as may have been expected. Table I shows a list of 16 medicines for 
which cost differentials of 1% or less were seen. 
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Competition theory would seem to support a contention that the cost 
differential between the branded and the lowest priced generic version 
would be related to the number of generic equivalents on the market. 
The maximal cost differentials are often only achieved when at least nine 
such products are on the market. In order to test this contention, within 
the narrow sample of medicines used in the management of chronic 
conditions, the cost differentials were plotted against the corresponding 
number of generic equivalents (Figure 2). 
A weak correlation between the number of generics and the size of the 
cost differential was apparent (correlation coefficient 0.49). There were 
examples of high-cost differentials in highly competitive areas of the 
market. For example, 17 generic versions of metronidazole were identified, 
and the cost differential between the brand and generic versions was 
96.9%. There were, however, exceptions. While only one generic version 
of imipramine was identified, the cost differential compared to the brand 
version was 85.4%. The median cost differentials associated with different 
numbers of generic versions are shown in Table II. 
Figure 1: Median cost differentials per CDL algorithm






































































































































































Table I: Medicines for which the cost differential between generic 
versions was 1% or less
 Medicine Cost differential between generic versions (%) 
 Amoxicillin capsules 500 mg 0.1 
 Doxycycline tablets 100 mg 0.9 
 Enalapril tablets 20 mg 0.0 
 Ramipril capsules 10 mg 0.0 
 Ciprofloxacin tablets 500 mg 0.9 
 Metronidazole infusion 500 mg/100 ml 0.0 
 Glimepiride tablets 4 mg 0.0 
 Amiodarone tablets 200 mg 0.0 
 Pravastatin tablets 40 mg 0.1 
 Indapamide tablets 2.5 mg 1.0 
 Spironolactone tablets 25 mg 0.0 
 Oxybutynin tablets 5 mg 0.5 
 Sulpiride capsules 50 mg 0.0 
 Clozapine tablets 100 mg 0.0 
 Clomipramine tablets 25 mg 0.1 
 Dosulepin tablets 75 mg 0.1
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Discussion
This study has shown that, for the medicines listed (either as individual 
medicines or as pharmacological groups) in the CDL algorithms, which 
form the basis for the Prescribed Minimum Benefits that have to be 
provided by all medical schemes, a substantial number are available 
as both brand and generic versions. Of the 25 CDL conditions for which 
specific algorithms were provided by the CMS, all but three listed 
medicines for which a generic version was available. An important 
limitation of this study was that only those generic versions listed in 
MIMS were identified. It is probable that more generic versions were 
on the market at the time of the study, but neither listed in MIMS, nor 
easily identified in the pricing source used. It is also possible that these 
unidentified generic versions were priced even lower than were those 
listed in MIMS. If that were the case, then the cost differentials calculated 
would have represented an under-estimate of the possible savings.
Another important limitation is that no account was taken of the 
prevalence of the conditions included. The CMS has included a listing of 
the percentage prevalence of the 25 CDL conditions as a group, and for 
the 10 most prevalent of these conditions, but has also expressed concern 
about the quality of the data submitted by medical schemes.2 However, 
even these figures do not allow for the prevalence of use of individual 
medicines in each algorithm to be determined with any certainty. 
Previous studies in South Africa have addressed this problem in different 
ways, and have provided quite different estimates of the potential costs 
savings that might accrue from increased use of generics. Based on 
a random sample of prescriptions taken from 10 pharmacies, Abdool 
Karrim et al estimated that a cost savings of 9.9% would have been 
possible if generic equivalents were substituted in those cases where 
the brand name products were specifically prescribed.8 This was broadly 
consistent with a far older study, which had estimated that cost savings 
of about 9.3% (based on 1989 data) would be possible if a maximum 
medical aid price (MMAP) system were to be introduced, in terms of 
which a specified maximum price would be paid for off-patent products 
that had generic equivalents.9 More recently, Djolov has used total private 
sector sales of the 200 most-sold medicines (in 2001) as the basis for 
calculating the potential costs savings if the least expensive version of 
the 46 products for which a generic was available (identified from MIMS) 
was supplied instead.10 Potential savings (6.1%) were represented as the 
percentage of the total sales for the top 200 products, which represented 
53% of the private sector sales value of all “ethical” medicines in 2001. 
This author argued that the mandatory nature of the state’s intervention 
in this area would not only achieve little in the way of savings, but would 
also reduce innovation and, perhaps, increase the risk of innovator 
manufacturers leaving the local market. Our study has shown potential 
costs savings in particular CDL conditions may be far higher. These 
include CDL conditions listed by the CMS as being the 10 most prevalent, 
based on available data. The 10 most prevalent CDL conditions reported 
were hypertension, hyperlipidaemia, asthma, ischaemic heart disease, 
cardiomyopathy, cardiac failure, hypothyroidism, type 2 diabetes mellitus, 
epilepsy and type 1 diabetes mellitus. The potential savings have been 
reported in percentage terms, based on the cost per DDD per month. 
As mentioned previously, this is an artificial measure, designed for 
pharmacoepidemiological studies. Assessing the exact cost implications 
in a particular patient is complicated by the differences in doses actually 
prescribed. Some indication, however, can be gleaned from the following 
examples. The single exit price of 50 tablets beta-blocker propranolol 
40 mg at the time of this study ranged from R135.39 for the brand 
version to R6.78 for the lowest priced generic (a differential of 95%). 
Similarly, the difference between the single exit price for atenolol 
100 mg 30s was 88% (R204.06 for the brand and R25.02 for the generic 
version). A lower differential of 42% was seen for carvedilol 25 mg 30s 
(R99.84, compared with R58.40). An analogous situation could be seen 
in relation to the angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitors: captopril 
25 mg 60s (R153.38 for the brand version; R20.98 for the generic; 
86%), analapril 10 mg 28s (R39.62; R28.49; 28%), and ramipril 5 mg 
30s (R155.53; R90.97; 42%).
Some of the CDL conditions illustrate a particular problem with the 
algorithms, as currently stated. Where a pharmacological class is stated 
(such as the angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitors), this would include 
not only the earlier members of the class, for which generic versions may 
have been developed, but also later patented, and thus patent-protected, 
versions, some of which may have marginal benefits, if any.11 Such 
“me-too” medicines may add to the average costs of applying the 
algorithm, without adding any clinical benefit. Where no preference is 
explicitly stated in the algorithm, the onus is on the scheme to develop 
a more detailed formulary or reference pricing system in order to avoid 
increased expenditure. In contrast, the public sector standard treatment 
guidelines (STGs) follow the convention of the WHO’s Model Essential 
Medicines List. An example from a class such as the angiotensin 
converting enzyme inhibitors would be listed, but each provincial 
service would be expected to procure only one from the class, and 
not necessarily make available a selection. Other pharmacological 
classes that could be problematic in this regard are the sulphonylureas, 
the inhaled corticosteroids, the inhaled anticholinergics, the oral 
beta-blockers, and the hydroxy-methylglutaryl-coenzyme A reductase 
inhibitors (statins). The inhaled anticholinergics provide a particular 
challenge. This class is represented by two very different products, 
ipratropium and tiotropium, which vary in many regards, including price. 
At times, the CMS algorithms differ markedly from the public sector STGs. 
Examples include the inclusion of the angiotensin receptor blockers in 
hypertension, prostaglandin analogues in glaucoma, and the broad range 
of products provided for in schizophrenia. It is beyond the scope of this 
Table II: Cost differentials associated with different numbers of 
generic versions
Number of generic 
versions identified
Total number of 
medicines  
represented
Median cost differentials 
between brand and  
generic versions (%) 
 1 25 35.0 
 2 17 50.9 
 3 12 45.8 
 4 5 41.5 
 5 3 79.5 
 6 3 39.4 
 7 5 88.4 
 8 3 35.2 
 9 1 90.4 
 10 2 88.3 
 11 1 92.4 
 14 2 90.6 
 17 1 96.9
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study to comment on the applicability of each of these inclusions. As with 
the use of broad pharmacological classes instead of identified medicines 
or exemplars of a class, some justification may be possible, on the 
basis of high quality evidence. However, the CMS algorithms provide no 
evidentiary basis for any inclusions or exclusions.
Conclusion
The CMS announced in its 2006/2007 Annual Report that the process 
of obtaining comment on the CDL algorithms had been completed, and 
that revisions were in the process of being prepared. Given the problems 
identified in this study, an argument could be made for more closely 
aligning the process of developing the National Essential Drugs List 
(which is derived from the STGs applicable at various levels) and the 
development of the CMS algorithms for the PMB CDLs. By being more 
specific about which medicines should be covered, needless expenditure 
on “me-too” agents of doubtful additional benefit could be avoided. 
Where clinically warranted, appropriate choices could be provided (for 
example, based on adverse effect profiles or the propensity to interact 
with concomitant medication). 
Lastly, finality in respect of the pricing of medicines needs to be 
achieved. This applies not only to the dispensing fee but also to the 
proposed benchmarking process.12 The proposed 40% differential 
between brand and generic names carries the risk that this will become 
the norm, rather than the minimum. The impact on the affordability, and 
thus the longer-term viability, of the Prescribed Minimum Benefits could 
be considerable.
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